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German Government Report

Americans Against World Empire

 

Very important documents. German govt. reports state that no extensive persecution of Albanians in Kosovo was taking place prior to the Nato bombing. ( The German govt. nonetheless supported the bombing decision. ) This revelation completely undercuts the pro-war argument that Nato bombing was intended to prevent "genocide." It is not that the "genocide" or "ethnic cleansing" accelerated after the bombing; it simply did not exist prior to the bombing--it began with the bombing. The documents point out that the Serbian forces were fighting the KLA, not Albanians in general.
Steve Sniegoski

http://www.zmag.org/ZNETTOPnoanimation.html

INTERNAL DOCUMENTS
FROM GERMANY'S FOREIGN OFFICE
REGARDING PRE-BOMBARDMENT
GENOCIDE IN KOSOVO

From official documents by the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms as published by the German daily junge welt on April 24, 1999     Translated by Eric Canepa of the Brecht Forum, New York.

JUNGE WELT

As in the case of the Clinton Administration, the present regime in
Germany, specifically Joschka Fischer's Foreign Office, has justified its
intervention in Kosovo by pointing to a "humanitarian catastrophe,"
"genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" occurring there, especially in the
months immediately preceding the NATO attack. The following internal
documents from Fischer's ministry and from various regional
Administrative Courts in Germany spanning the year before the start of
NATO's air attacks, attest that criteria of ethnic cleansing and genocide
were not met. The Foreign Office documents were responses to the
courts' needs in deciding the status of Kosovo-Albanian refugees in
Germany. Although one might in these cases suppose a bias in favor of
downplaying a humanitarian catastrophe in order to limit refugees, it
nevertheless remains highly significant that the Foreign Office, in contrast
to its public assertion of ethnic cleansing and genocide in justifying
NATO intervention, privately continued to deny their existence as
Yugoslav policy in this crucial period. And this continued to be their
assessment even in March of this year. Thus these documents tend to
show that stopping genocide was not the reason the German government,
and by implication NATO, intervened in Kosovo, and that genocide (as
understood in German and international law) in Kosovo did not precede
NATO bombardment, at least not from early 1998 through March, 1999,
but is a product of it.

Excerpts from the these official documents were obtained by IALANA
(International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms) which sent
them to various media. The texts used here were published in the German
daily junge welt on April 24, 1999. (See
http://www.jungewelt.de/1999/04-24/011.shtml as well as the commentary  https://www.jungewelt.de/loginFailed.php?ref=/1999/04-24/011.shtml     https://www.jungewelt.de/loginFailed.php?ref=/1999/04-24/011.shtml
at http://www.jungewelt.de/1999/04-24/001.shtml). According to my
sources, this is as complete a reproduction of the documents as exists in
the German media at the time of this writing. What follows is my
translation of these published excerpts.

Eric Canepa Brecht Forum, New York April 28, 1999



I: Intelligence report from the Foreign Office January 6, 1999 to the
Bavarian Administrative Court, Ansbach:

"At this time, an increasing tendency is observable inside the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of refugees returning to their
dwellings. ... Regardless of the desolate economic situation in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (according to official
information of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 700,000
refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzogovina have found
lodging since 1991), no cases of chronic malnutrition or
insufficient medical treatment among the refugees are known
and significant homelessness has not been observed. ...
According to the Foreign Office's assessment, individual
Kosovo-Albanians (and their immediate families) still have
limited possibilities of settling in those parts of Yugoslavia in
which their countrymen or friends already live and who are
ready to take them in and support them."

II. Intelligence report from the Foreign Office, January 12, 1999 to the
Administrative Court of Trier (Az: 514-516.80/32 426):

"Even in Kosovo an explicit political persecution linked to
Albanian ethnicity is not verifiable. The East of Kosovo is still
not involved in armed conflict. Public life in cities like Pristina,
Urosevac, Gnjilan, etc. has, in the entire conflict period,
continued on a relatively normal basis." The "actions of the
security forces (were) not directed against the
Kosovo-Albanians as an ethnically defined group, but against
the military opponent and its actual or alleged supporters."

III. Report of the Foreign Office March 15, 1999 (Az: 514-516,80/33841)
to the Administrative Court, Mainz:

"As laid out in the status report of November 18, 1998, the
KLA has resumed its positions after the partial withdrawal of
the (Serbian) security forces in October 1998, so it once
again controls broad areas in the zone of conflict. Before the
beginning of spring 1999 there were still clashes between the
KLA and security forces, although these have not until now
reached the intensity of the battles of spring and summer
1998."

IV: Opinion of the Bavarian Administrative Court, October 29, 1998 (Az:
22 BA 94.34252):

"The Foreign Office's status reports of May 6, June 8 and July
13, 1998, given to the plaintiffs in the summons to a verbal
deliberation, do not allow the conclusion that there is group
persecution of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Not even
regional group persecution, applied to all ethnic Albanians
from a specific part of Kosovo, can be observed with sufficient
certainty. The violent actions of the Yugoslav military and
police since February 1998 were aimed at separatist
activities and are no proof of a persecution of the whole
Albanian ethnic group in Kosovo or in a part of it. What was
involved in the Yugoslav violent actions and excesses since
February 1998 was a selective forcible action against the
military underground movement (especially the KLA) and
people in immediate contact with it in its areas of operation.
...A state program or persecution aimed at the whole ethnic
group of Albanians exists neither now nor earlier."

V. Opinion of the Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg, February
4, 1999 (Az: A 14 S 22276/98):

"The various reports presented to the senate all agree that the
often feared humanitarian catastrophe threatening the
Albanian civil population has been averted. ... This appears to
be the case since the winding down of combat in connection
with an agreement made with the Serbian leadership at the
end of 1998 (Status Report of the Foreign Office, November
18, 1998). Since that time both the security situation and the
conditions of life of the Albanian-derived population have
noticeably improved. ... Specifically in the larger cities public
life has since returned to relative normality (cf. on this Foreign
Office, January 12, 1999 to the Administrative Court of Trier;
December 28, 1998 to the Upper Administrative Court of
Lüneberg and December 23, 1998 to the Administrative Court
at Kassel), even though tensions between the population
groups have meanwhile increased due to individual acts of
violence... Single instances of excessive acts of violence
against the civil population, e.g. in Racak, have, in world
opinion, been laid at the feet of the Serbian side and have
aroused great indignation. But the number and frequency of
such excesses do not warrant the conclusion that every
Albanian living in Kosovo is exposed to extreme danger to life
and limb nor is everyone who returns there threatened with
death and severe injury."

VI: Opinion of the Upper Administrative Court at Münster, February 24,
1999 (Az: 14 A 3840/94,A):

"There is no sufficient actual proof of a secret program, or an
unspoken consensus on the Serbian side, to liquidate the
Albanian people, to drive it out or otherwise to persecute it in
the extreme manner presently described. ... If Serbian state
power carries out its laws and in so doing necessarily puts
pressure on an Albanian ethnic group which turns its back on
the state and is for supporting a boycott, then the objective
direction of these measures is not that of a programmatic
persecution of this population group ...Even if the Serbian
state were benevolently to accept or even to intend that a part
of the citizenry which sees itself in a hopeless situation or
opposes compulsory measures, should emigrate, this still
does not represent a program of persecution aimed at the
whole of the Albanian majority (in Kosovo)."

"If moreover the (Yugoslav) state reacts to separatist strivings
with consistent and harsh execution of its laws and with
anti-separatist measures, and if some of those involved
decide to go abroad as a result, this is still not a deliberate
policy of the (Yugoslav) state aiming at ostracizing and
expelling the minority; on the contrary it is directed toward
keeping this people within the state federation."

"Events since February and March 1998 do not evidence a
persecution program based on Albanian ethnicity. The
measures taken by the armed Serbian forces are in the first
instance directed toward combatting the KLA and its
supposed adherents and supporters."

VII: Opinion of the Upper Administrative Court at Münster, March 11, 1999
(Az: 13A 3894/94.A):

"Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo have neither been nor are now
exposed to regional or countrywide group persecution in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." (Thesis 1)